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Commentaries and Replies
On "American Landpower and Modern
US Generalship"
Thomas E. Ricks
This commentary is in reply to David G. Fivecoat's article "American Landpower and
Modern US Generalship" published in the Winter-Spring 2013 issue of Parameters (vol.
42, no. 4/vol 43, no. 1).

T

hank you for running Lieutenant Colonel David G. Fivecoat’s
essay on “American Landpower and Modern US Generalship”
(Winter-Spring 2013). I don’t agree with everything he writes, but
nonetheless am pleased to see Fivecoat’s article because it is exactly the
type of work I hoped my book The Generals: American Military Command
from World War II to Today would provoke. I had thought that General
Brown’s articles in ARMY magazine might launch such a discussion, but
that magazine shied away from engaging, without explaining why, as if discussing the quality of leadership in today’s Army somehow was impolite.
Most of all, I am fascinated by Fivecoat’s finding (page 74) that
leading a division in combat in Iraq seems to have hurt an officer’s
chances of promotion. That worries me. What does it mean? That discovery of his indicates that the Army of the Iraq-Afghanistan era is out
of step from the historical tradition that for an officer, time in combat
is the royal road to advancement. I cannot think of other wars in which
service in combat hurt an officer’s chance of promotion. It is, as Fivecoat
almost (but not quite) says, worrisome evidence that the Army for close
to a decade persisted in using a peacetime promotion system in wartime.
In addition to breaking new ground intellectually, Fivecoat’s article
is also courageous. It is one thing for me, a civilian author, to question
the quality of American generalship in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is quite
another thing for an active duty lieutenant colonel to do so, especially
since the Army’s official histories have tiptoed around the issue of the
failings of senior leadership in our recent wars.
Two final observations:
•• I think Lieutenant Colonel Fivecoat lets today’s Army off too easily on
its lack of transparency. To me this reflects a bit of drift in the service,
a loss of the sense of being answerable to the nation and the people.
Being close-mouthed about its leadership problems gives the impression that the Army’s leaders care more about the feelings of generals
than the support of the American people.
•• Finally, I have to question Fivecoat’s assertion that minimizing disruption optimizes performance. It wasn’t the case in World War II. Why
would it be the case in Afghanistan or Iraq? It may be—but it remains
an unproven assumption, and to my mind, a questionable one. The
opportunity cost of averting disruption can be large, because such
passivity (or “subtlety,” as he terms it) results in the apparent rewarding of risk-averse or mediocre commanders. What would Matthew
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Ridgway say about such a policy of minimizing disruption?
Thank you again for running such an illuminating and thoughtprovoking article.

The Author Replies
David G. Fivecoat

M

r. Thomas Ricks’s book The Generals did a superb job at generating discussion across the military on the merits of American
generalship since World War II. My article, “American
Landpower and Modern US Generalship” in the Winter-Spring 2013
edition of Parameters, was my attempt to add depth to the dialogue
about the major generals who led division-sized formations in Iraq and
Afghanistan since 9/11.
To be sure, the article is not all encompassing. Although the post9/11 group of major generals is a small data set, it is almost one-third
the size of the World War II cohort and will continue to grow while
the United States military assists the Afghanistan government’s counterinsurgency operations for the next several years. Strictly speaking, it
might not be significant by the mathematical definition; but the division commanders of Iraq and Afghanistan are a notable group in the
historical sense. While I concede the mathematical limitations of the
evidence presented in the article, there is enough hard evidence to allow
us to move beyond questions of correlation and to discuss the matter of
causation, which, in the end, is far more important.
I acknowledge Mr. Ricks’s questioning whether military organizations should place a premium on reducing disruption. In forming my
thoughts on the adverse outcomes of firings, intellectually I drew upon
literature studying similar experiences in business and professional
sports. During a year as a battalion commander in Afghanistan, I (and
I’m sure my higher headquarters) wrestled with how to improve the
performance of subordinate units in an extremely ambiguous environment. Reliefs rarely seemed the best way forward for my unit or our
counterinsurgency campaign. There is a finer line to be drawn on this
measure than Ricks concedes.
Thanks again for the opportunity to contribute to the discussion. I
hope others are able to expand on and contribute to the conversation.
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On “Drones and US Strategy: Costs
and Benefits”
Ulrike Franke
This commentary is in response to Alan W. Dowd’s “Drone Wars: Risks and
Warnings”; W. Andrew Terrill’s “Drones over Yemen: Weighing Military Benefits
and Political Costs”; Greg Kennedy’s “Drones: Legitimacy and Anti-Americanism”;
and Jacqueline L. Hazelton’s “Drones: What Are They Good For?”All articles were
published in the Winter-Spring 2013 issue of Parameters (vol. 42, no. 4/vol 43, no. 1).

I

n the Winter-Spring 2013 issue of Parameters, four authors discussed
the new military tool the media has dubbed “drone” and which military
officials prefer to call Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) or Remotely
Piloted Vehicle (RPV). Alan W. Dowd, W. Andrew Terrill, Greg Kennedy,
and Jacqueline L. Hazelton assist the reader in gaining a better grasp of
one of today’s most debated issues—the increasing use of UAVs by the
US military and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in countries such
as Pakistan and Yemen.
Unfortunately, there is not as much scholarship on drones as one
might think. Consequently, the articles in the forum, in particular Alan
Dowd’s “Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings,” are predominantly based
on newspaper editorials and other media reports. Academia has indeed
been slow to respond to the unmanned (r)evolution in warfare. This
can be explained in part by the scarce source material—information on
military UAVs and their use is largely kept secret; reliable information
on missile strikes via UAVs is difficult to find, but is becoming more
available. The relative lack of scholarly work on the military and political impact of UAVs, however, illustrates a general problem academia
confronts when working on current affairs: the difficulty, if not inability,
of the academic peer-review process to keep abreast with fast-changing,
constantly developing current affairs. Jacqueline Hazelton should,
therefore, be given credit for using a considerable amount of scholarly
literature in her article “Drones: What Are They Good For?”
It is understandable, therefore, if authors sometimes revert to using
general media sources when academic literature is sparse. There is,
however, no excuse for using notoriously unreliable media reports for
information such as casualty assessments after drone strikes or for the
number of UAV users worldwide. In the last few years, several organizations started to gather more accurate information on these issues in a
methodologically sound fashion. Instead of using BBC News information on Pakistani drone strike casualties, Greg Kennedy should have
referenced numbers from the New America Foundation, the Long War
Journal, or the Bureau of Investigative Journalism (which incidentally is
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where BBC News gets its numbers).1 Instead of quoting USA Today concerning numbers of countries with UAVs, Alan Dowd could have used
the International Institute for Strategic Studies publication The Military
Balance or governmental information such that provided by the United
States Government Accountability Office.2
All four papers share one major—admittedly common—flaw:
the implicit equation of drones, MALE (Medium Altitude, Long
Endurance) UAVs, and armed UAVs/UCAVs. It is immensely important
to make these distinctions clear: “drone” is a term being used (incorrectly) to describe all kinds of unmanned aerial vehicles. (The better
term to describe modern unmanned aircraft is Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
[UAV].3) Modern UAVs, or drones, range from insect-sized aircraft to
airplanes the size of commercial airliners. A very small number of UAVs
can be armed, mostly with air-to-ground missiles. Accordingly, the
terms drone and UAV can describe both the Black Hornet—a small (4.7
inches, 16 grams) reconnaissance drone—as well as the Global Hawk,
a 14 ton aircraft with a 130.9 ft wingspan. Because UAVs come in so
many different forms and can be used for a large variety of tasks, an
increasing number of classifications and categorizations has been introduced. Usually, a distinction is made between mini, tactical, MALE, and
HALE (High Altitude, Long Endurance) UAVs. The most notorious
UAVs—the General Atomics Predator and Reaper which get by far the
most attention in the media—are both MALE UAVs. The term UCAV
(Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle) describes armed UAVs. Armed
UAVs can theoretically come in all sizes; for the moment, however, most
armed UAVs are MALE UAVs. The Reaper is the most potent UCAV
currently in use and can be armed with up to fourteen Hellfire missiles
or a combination of missiles and laser-guided bombs.
All four authors use the term drone, but none of them believes
it necessary to define what exactly is meant by it. By their writing it
becomes clear, however, they are not discussing drones in general, but
rather a very specific type of UAV used for a very specific purpose.
Jacqueline Hazelton notes “They can kill, disable, support fighters on
the ground, destroy, harry, hinder, deny access, observe, and track.” This
is not exactly false—but most of these attributes pertain to only a small
fraction of today’s drones, namely armed MALE UAVs. She also writes,
1     Bureau of Investigative Journalism, Covert War on Terror—The Datasets, January 3, 2013, http://
www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drone-data/; New America Foundation, The
Year of the Drone, http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones; Bill Roggio and Alexander
Mayer, “Charting the Data for US airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004-2013,” Long War Journal, April 17,
2013, http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes.php.
2     The Military Balance lists UAVs above 20 kg for all countries. International Institute for
Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2013 (London: Routledge, 2013). The US Government
Accountability Office has published a list of all suspected UAV users in 2012. “Non-proliferation:
Agencies Could Improve Information Sharing and End-Use Monitoring on Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle Exports,” US Government Accountability Office, July 2012, GAO-12-536: 10.
3     The definition of a drone is “an unmanned vehicle which conducts its mission without guidance from an external source.” This means that once launched, a drone’s flight path cannot be
changed. Modern unmanned aircraft are, therefore, better described by the term UAV, “a powered,
aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift,
can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a
lethal or nonlethal payload. Ballistic or semiballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, and artillery projectiles
are not considered unmanned aerial vehicles”. (All definitions taken from the “NATO Glossary of
Terms and Definitions (English and French),” NATO Standardization Agency (NSA) 2008, AAP6(2008), http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/other/nato2008.pdf. These definitions are also used by the
US Department of Defense and other governmental agencies.)
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“They are claimed to do less collateral damage than either missiles or
manned aerial bombing,” practically equating UAVs and missiles. Alan
Dowd writes that drones are “hitting targets from Asia to Africa,”
equipped with missiles fired “by a remote-control warrior sitting in the
safety of a nondescript building outside Las Vegas.” He considers them
“a cheap alternative to long-range, long-endurance warplanes.” None of
these statements applies to the large majority of drones, which are small
to medium-sized unarmed tactical surveillance UAVs. The statements
are only true for MALE UCAVs.
The misuse of the term drone is not only an analytical nuisance—it
has direct implications for the readers’ understanding of the issues surrounding UAV use. When Alan Dowd discusses UCAVs over nine pages
and then mentions an “estimated 75 countries have drone programs
underway,” there clearly is a risk readers will assume that 75 countries
have or will soon have armed MALE UAVs. In reality, of these 75 countries, only three are known to have UCAVs (the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Israel) and two (China and Iran) are suspected to have
UCAVs. Most states do not have MALE UAVs. It might be the author
was unaware of the distinctions. Quoting an Economist article which
states, “Training UAS [Unmanned Aerial System] controllers . . . costs
less than a tenth as much as turning out a fast-jet pilot,” Dowd replaces
UAV with UCAV and writes “training UCAV controllers costs less than
a tenth what it costs to train traditional combat aviators.”
Most importantly, it is crucial not to confuse the tool, i.e., armed
UAVs, with the strategy—targeted killing. A drone is an aircraft that
can be used (and is indeed being used) in conventional war settings
or for civilian purposes. It is not synonymous with targeted killings
or signature strikes, nor with surveillance or tapping, crop dusting or
real estate photography (all of which drones have been used for). Using
the term in a way that makes the reader confuse the tool and the task,
especially if the task is highly contentious and potentially illegal, holds a
risk of public opinion turning against the tool which can be, if used the
right way, of considerable military value.
The military and political value of using armed UAVs for missile
strikes in undeclared conflict zones is a question all four authors
approach. The shared sentiment is that the undeniable tactical victories
of targeted killings and signature strikes via UCAVs are lessened or even
neutralized by strategic setbacks. Andrew Terrill, in his excellent study
of US UCAV use in Yemen, states the use of military armed drones
“appear to have made a significant difference in helping the Yemeni
government cope with AQAP [al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula] while
reducing that organization’s ability to conduct international terrorism.” He, however, identifies the drone program as “deeply unpopular
with many Yemenis.” UAVs have been criticized for violating national
sovereignty, for putting psychological pressure on local populations in
areas routinely monitored by UAVs, and for causing high numbers of
civilian casualties. Terrill assesses there is, therefore, the “potential for
serious backlash over any drone-related disaster.” Greg Kennedy draws
attention to the risk of fuelling anti-American resentment and alienating
allies through the inconsiderate use of UCAVs. Alan Dowd cites former
US ambassador to NATO, Kurt Volker, who warns drone strikes might
play into terrorists’ hands by helping them recruit new followers.
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Unsurprisingly, because of this mixed picture, none of the authors
unequivocally argues in favor or against the increasing use of UCAVs.
Alan Dowd seems most favorable towards the new technology, but
underlines “there exists no simple solution to the drone dilemma.”
Andrew Terrill puts it best, indicating “drones are on probation” for the
moment. Much will depend on the United States’ handling of its growing
unmanned air force. It is important that academia actively participate
this discussion. It is insufficient to observe the development from afar
and to hide behind academic impartiality and objectivity. “Sparking
further analysis of drone strikes,” as Jacqueline Hazelton aims to, is
not enough. More pathbreaking scholarship on US drone use is needed.
Of the four articles presented in this issue, Andrew Terrill’s detailed
analysis of US drone use in Yemen and its military and political benefits
and costs meets these requirements best.
These four articles provide a useful introduction and overview of
central issues surrounding U(C)AV use. More analysis is to come, and,
as Hazelton points out, “Many good minds are already at work, and
more evidence should become available as time passes and, perhaps, as
the United States makes its drone programs more transparent.” Those
interested in the future of drone use in the United States and worldwide
have a lot to look forward to.
On occasion, we receive commentary to articles published in the journal. We offer our
authors the opportunity to review and respond to that commentary. The following reply is
from Alan W. Dowd, author of “Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings.”

One Author Replies
Alan W. Dowd

A

lthough Ms. Franke does not appear to challenge the central
premise of my essay—that drone warfare opens the United
States to a range of geostrategic, geopolitical, constitutional,
and public policy challenges the American people and their elected representatives have not fully considered—she offers some helpful insights.
Among the most important of these is the notion that we should “not
confuse the tool, i.e., armed UAVs, with the strategy—targeted killing.”
Regrettably, that appears to be what is happening in policymaking circles,
as targeted killing with UCAVs—a tactic—has taken the place of strategy. Even so, I share her view that UCAVs can be a tool of considerable
military value, but only if their use is more restrained and better defined
by policymakers.
Her commentary emphasizes the importance of distinguishing
between UAVs and UCAVs. This admonition is well taken. My essay
made sure to note, “In the past decade, the US drone fleet has swelled
from 50 planes to 7,500, though the vast majority of these drones are
not UCAVs,” and made a distinction between the Army’s fleet of reconnaissance/surveillance drones and strike drones. I did use the “UCAV”
acronym in discussing the disparity between manned and unmanned
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training costs. It is worth noting that even some Pentagon documents
use the umbrella term “UAS”—or “unmanned aerial systems”—in
discussing strike and nonstrike drones. Moreover, there is a significant difference in the costs of training drone operators and traditional
pilots. A recent Air Force report discussing MQ-1 Predators and MQ-9
Reapers—importantly, the report describes the MQ-1 as focusing on
“interdiction and armed reconnaissance against critical, perishable
targets” and the MQ-9 as “a persistent hunter-killer”—concluded that
using nonaviators to operate these armed drones could save several
hundred thousand dollars per pilot/controller.
Ms. Franke takes issue with my mention of 75 countries having
drone programs underway. My essay did not say that all of them are
UCAV programs, but some are. In fact, Russia is developing what it calls
“automated strike aircraft.” Germany is procuring armed drones. After
its experience in Libya and Mali, France is keenly interested in acquiring
the Reaper. And then there are the known unknowns: Are Hezbollah’s
drones armed? Has North Korea retooled its drones into offensive
weapons? To whom will China sell its armed drones? Moreover, a drone
does not have to be armed to trigger an international incident, as the
United States and Iran have learned, which is one of my broader points:
Drones could usher in a new age of accidental wars.
A final caveat on sourcing—the commentator writes, “There is not
as much scholarship on drones as one might think; most of the articles
. . . are predominantly based on newspaper editorials and other media
reports,” and warns against using “notoriously unreliable media reports.”
First, I am aware of no “notoriously unreliable media reports” cited in
my essay. Second, owing to the nature of this new, evolving weapons
system, the use of media reports as supporting material is unavoidable.
Third, just as it is problematic to conflate “UAV” and “UCAV,” it is
problematic to conflate “editorials” and “media reports.” Of the 49 footnotes in my essay, one comes from an editorial: a New York Times editorial
expressly cited to convey how armed drones are being promoted by the
press. Two come from authoritative essays penned by topic experts: a
former US ambassador and a former National Security Council official. There are 20 news sources cited, 6 Defense Department reports,
5 books, 3 scholarly journals/reports, 2 military briefings/interviews, 2
polls, one State Department briefing, one treaty, and one statute.
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On "Reaffirming the Utility of
Nuclear Weapons"
Robert H. Gregory
This commentary is in response to Bradley A. Thayer and Thomas M. Skypek's article
"Reaffirming the Utility of Nuclear Weapons" published in the Winter-Spring 2013
issue of Parameters (vol. 42, no. 4/vol. 43, no. 1).

B
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radley Thayer and Thomas Skypek make the following assertion: “Nuclear weapons deter enemies such as al Qaeda who
would deliberately attack the United States as well as countries
like China that might be tempted to attack the US homeland as the result
of escalation from a crisis (e.g., Taiwan in 1995-96).” This assertion
groups together state and nonstate actors in a problematic manner. Both
components of the assertion are questionable. The claim that nuclear
weapons can deter al Qaeda from attacking the US homeland, or China
from attacking the US homeland in a potential Taiwan Straits crisis, lacks
both nuance and evidence.
There are no historical examples to support the assertion that al
Qaeda is deterred by nuclear weapons. On the contrary, al Qaeda has
made several attacks against the United States despite our nuclear status.
In those cases, the use (or threat of use) of nuclear weapons was not
feasible because these weapons are too blunt to target anything of significance to a terrorist organization. Al Qaeda seems to be unaffected
by traditional conceptions of deterrence as forged during the Cold War.
Terrorist organizations may be deterred more by Special Operations
Forces (SOF) raids, drone strikes, or the vigilance of local law enforcement than by fear of a nuclear strike. In fact, a nuclear strike might
play into terrorist hands. Fear and credibility are central elements of
deterrence. Deterrence and coercion require credibly putting something
at risk an adversary holds dear. Some terrorists do not even fear losing
their lives, so they are impossible to deter; however, this does not mean
their efforts cannot be foiled, though not with nuclear weapons.
Would Chinese military strategists be “tempted” to consider
attacking the US homeland with nuclear weapons to advance interests
in Taiwan during a crisis? It was actually the other way around during
the First Taiwan Straits Crisis when the Eisenhower administration
considered using nuclear weapons against China. By the Third Taiwan
Crisis, China was a well-established nuclear power, capable of putting
some American cities at risk. That crisis involved two nation-states
with nuclear weapons, yet these weapons did not alter the strategic
calculus of either side. It started when the United States granted a visa
for Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui to visit and present a speech at
Cornell University in May 1995. The speech was intended to trumpet the
accomplishments of democratization in Taiwan and was seen by China
as a public display of Taiwan’s ambition towards diplomatic recognition
and independence. China responded to this visit with a show of force
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consisting of missile launches into waters near Taiwanese ports, and
live fire artillery exercises off the coast of mainland China adjacent to
the Taiwan Strait. The United States subsequently responded with the
deployment of two carrier battle groups to the region in March 1996. At
no time during the crisis did either side make decisions solely based on
the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons. Instead, both sides reacted to
each other’s deployments of conventional naval and land forces while
simultaneously engaging in high-level diplomatic exchanges.
The United States’ tit-for-tat strategy, with proportional displays of
conventional force, eventually deterred further escalation—when combined with reassurance that the decision to grant a visa to Lee was not a
change in the United States’ official position regarding Taiwan. During
the crisis, then President Clinton privately communicated in a letter to
then President Jiang Zemin, “that U.S. policy opposed Taiwan independence, did not support Taiwan membership in the UN and did not
support a two-China policy or a policy of one China and one Taiwan.”4
Neither side delivered a fait accompli during the crisis. Essentially, China’s
show of force caused the United States to reaffirm its refusal to recognize Taiwan, and the United States’ reciprocal show of force affirmed
America would not back down from its decision to grant Lee a visa. Even
today, the United States does not formally recognize Taiwan; it continues
to perform a similarly delicate balancing act with its position on Taiwan
independence. This position is more one of diplomatic ambiguity to save
face in a crisis rather than one of extended nuclear deterrence. Extending
the nuclear umbrella to Taiwan does not serve as a credible deterrent.
Should the United States risk American cities in a nuclear exchange with
China to save Taiwan from a Chinese onslaught? During the Cold War,
would we have risked losing New York to save Berlin? These are the
dilemmas that would be created by the type of nuclear brinksmanship
the authors espouse. Raising the stakes ever-higher to even the playing
field is a strategy that stems from weakness.
The authors make reckless assertions regarding the utility of nuclear
weapons. The rapid ability to cause massive, indiscriminate damage is not
always militarily useful, particularly when dealing with a terrorist organization or another nuclear power. The authors contend that having less
than 300 nuclear weapons will make the United States impotent. They
do not consider the possibility that nuclear weapons have diminishing
marginal utility for deterrence and coercion when possessed in evergreater quantities. The highly destructive power of nuclear weapons,
combined with the possibility a conflict may escalate to the point of
nuclear exchange, demands a higher level of academic scrutiny when
making assertions regarding the utility of these weapons. Unfounded
assertions raise the potential for miscalculation in a crisis.

4     Robert S. Ross, “The 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and Use
of Force,” International Security 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 8.
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The Authors Reply
Bradley A. Thayer and Thomas M. Skypek

W

e thank Robert H. Gregory for raising several excellent points
and welcome the opportunity to respond. Gregory raises two
objections: first, that nuclear weapons do not deter terrorists; and, second, that China would not attack the United States over
Taiwan. We address each in turn in this brief reply.
We agree that deterrence of terrorists is a complex and multifaceted issue as terrorists are motivated by many ideologies and beliefs. In
addition, we concur that deterrence of terrorism requires many tools
in the toolkit, including those he suggests. Where we disagree is in the
nature of the threat. First, if we focus specifically on al Qaeda and associated movements, we see they are dynamic and evolving organizations,
whose motivations and capabilities might be even more dangerous and
potent in the future. We would not want to dismiss the role that nuclear
weapons—in this instance, low yield nuclear weapons—may play in targeting a potential underground facility, or providing US decisionmakers
with the option of doing so. Second, as state sponsorship is a likely path
for al Qaeda and associated movements to acquire fissile material or
nuclear weapons, we recognize the important role nuclear weapons may
play in deterring state sponsors of terrorism. It is critical any potential
state sponsors of al Qaeda and associated movements know the United
States will hold them accountable if weapons of mass destruction are
shared with terrorist groups. Indeed, this has been proclaimed by senior
US national security decisionmakers and was a major motivation for
the French declaration in 2006 that limited nuclear strikes might be
employed against a state that launched a terrorist attack against it.
Concerning China, there are two reasons we are less sanguine than
Gregory about the willingness of the Chinese to escalate over Taiwan.
The first reason is the balance of resolve: the Chinese believe Taiwan
is a part of China, thus making their threats and readiness to use force
more credible. The second reason is the Chinese are not transparent in
strategic matters so we do not know in what circumstances the Chinese
would believe escalation served their interests. We do not know if the
Chinese conceive of escalation as the Soviet Union and the United States
did during the Cold War, if escalation may be controlled, or what its
thresholds are. Gregory ascribes the peaceful resolutions of the Taiwan
crises to diplomacy alone. However, he fails to acknowledge the role
played by nuclear weapons in establishing the environment that led to
peaceful resolutions.
Accordingly, it is essential to acknowledge that the role of US
nuclear weapons is to deter escalation over Taiwan or other significant
territorial disputes. The United States must have the capability to deter
Chinese escalation and coerce Beijing into deescalating. International
stability, prudence, and the credibility of the United States require strategic superiority. This superiority requires robust strategic capabilities,
including an arsenal large enough to meet multiple present and future
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threats—coupled with the appropriate declaratory policy, doctrine,
training, and other critical support.
No strategic tool solves all strategic problems. US nuclear weapons
did not prevent America’s loss in Vietnam, and, at present, China and
the United States are fighting a cyberwar unclouded by their strategic
arsenals. Yet, it would be a disastrous mistake to yield to a proclivity to
minimize or dismiss the contributions of nuclear weapons to the security
of the United States in the past, present, or future. The United States must
have robust conventional and strategic forces to meet its many strategic
commitments in a host of circumstances. Fundamentally, international
politics has not changed. The role of military power and the need to
deter and coerce opponents is the same today as in Metternich’s or Sun
Tzu’s time. The strategic arsenal of the United States plays a major role
in protecting the American people and its allies, and allows the United
States to advance its interests against those who oppose it. Indeed, the
lack of any great power wars since 1945 can be largely attributed to the
environment, fraught with risks to be sure, created by these weapons.
The value of the absolute weapon identified by Bernard Brodie almost
70 years ago remains true today.

